I think it's generous to consider MCAS a variety of "flight envelope protection" considering in the working case it causes a MAX to behave unlike an NG in the same situation. In the perturbed case it's a likely saboteur.
Air France was criticized for not having high altitude training for the “vol avec IAS douteuse” procedure, in the Air France 447 final report. Pilots need to know all behaviors, natural and artificial, of an airplane.
I am very curious to what degree airlines knew of MCAS, and whether they instigated or were part of the conspiracy to withhold necessary training from pilots in order to avoid different a type certification for the 737 MAX, and thereby avoid pilots needing a type rating for it. The decision to deny training for MCAS is 180 degrees from the lesson that should have been learned from AF 447.
Comments
I think it's generous to consider MCAS a variety of "flight envelope protection" considering in the working case it causes a MAX to behave unlike an NG in the same situation. In the perturbed case it's a likely saboteur.
Air France was criticized for not having high altitude training for the “vol avec IAS douteuse” procedure, in the Air France 447 final report. Pilots need to know all behaviors, natural and artificial, of an airplane.
I am very curious to what degree airlines knew of MCAS, and whether they instigated or were part of the conspiracy to withhold necessary training from pilots in order to avoid different a type certification for the 737 MAX, and thereby avoid pilots needing a type rating for it. The decision to deny training for MCAS is 180 degrees from the lesson that should have been learned from AF 447.