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Comment on Three locks for your SSH doorparent

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I'm just gonna rephrase and repeat this bit, because it seems to be not completely understood:

Do not allow password logins. Do. Not.

Have a method to redact keys quickly. The advice of the article becomes irrelevant. If someone gets hold of an unencrypted/crackable private key, they'll likely also have access to the secret portnumber, knock sequence and username, so nothing much gained there.

It seems to me (no security expert by any means) that port knocking and similar schemes are useful because they're orthogonal to SSH infrastructure and thus can provide a certain amount of defense against sshd 0-days and the like.

Consider the Debian PRNG flaw from a couple years ago. As I understand it, most SSH/SSL keys generated on Debian and Debian-derived boxes over a period of about two years were (rather) easily guessable. Even if you were able to redact any compromised keys as soon as this was publicly revealed, who knows how long malicious attackers may have known about it before it was made public. If your server had port knocking enabled you would have had a bit of insulation from this attack.

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