I can't really find a statement on that either way. The 3 requirements in this memo do not include such a stipulation, though. (The requirements are to minimize the capture, destroy extra data, and not use extra data.) Part of their operation involves MITM'ing between the phone and the network[0], which probably means the network has not been told it's happening.
Even if they have permission, do you think that's as stringent as it would be if they had to subpoena this from the network? Some agencies are using these things daily, or hundreds of times in a few years, without even telling the courts.[1] The FCC only approved them for emergency use.[2] They are probably not licensed for most of the times they are used, even if the network says OK.
Comments
I can't really find a statement on that either way. The 3 requirements in this memo do not include such a stipulation, though. (The requirements are to minimize the capture, destroy extra data, and not use extra data.) Part of their operation involves MITM'ing between the phone and the network[0], which probably means the network has not been told it's happening.
Even if they have permission, do you think that's as stringent as it would be if they had to subpoena this from the network? Some agencies are using these things daily, or hundreds of times in a few years, without even telling the courts.[1] The FCC only approved them for emergency use.[2] They are probably not licensed for most of the times they are used, even if the network says OK.
[0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stingray_phone_tracker#Interce... [1] http://www.wired.com/2014/03/stingray/ [2] http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/09/new-e-mail-shows-...