Random implies no agent (self) at all. It's just a roll of the dice.
Pre-determined, on the other hand, it's not incompatible with free will (precisely because free-will doesn't mean "randomness" -- it just means it's not imposed upon you by an external agent.
Let's imagine a totally deterministic universe. How could ever pre-determined play well with "not imposed upon you by an external agent"?
Because this pre-determined you is not an external agent imposing its will on a third subject, it's exactly who you are as a "self".
That is, you are your history (and JUST that), and the only decision your self could make is a decision based on its precise history, which is exactly what it makes every time.
Anything else wouldn't be YOU or YOUR free will, it will be arbitrary (random).
So, I think people just have this misconception that "free will" should have the emphasis on "free" -- to mean "whatever".
But the emphasis should be that it's a "will", i.e. the expression of the subject. And such an expression can only be understood in the sense of a subject that has history (you weren't just born this instant) and that makes decisions precisely drawing upon that history -- not just as a source of inspiration of his final decision, but as the total embodiment of his past (with all its aspects) in his decision.
In other words, free will is not you being free to will anything. It's just you being free to be you -- an entity of a concrete past.
I disagree with at least one of your premises. In a deterministic universe, one could (assuming perfect knowledge) predict this exact comment you would make now, thousands of years before you were even born. How is that free will?
I disagree that there can be free will when all your actions can be known to an omniscient party beforehand. Where's the freedom in that?
I disagree with at least one of your premises. In a deterministic universe, one could (assuming perfect knowledge) predict this exact comment you would make now, thousands of years before you were even born. How is that free will?
How is that not?
Your objection just restates "for me free will shouldn't be deterministic and its decisions shouldn't be known in advance".
Whereas the core of my argument was that it doesn't matter if it's deterministic and known in advance, because it's still the inevitable expression of one's self (which has a certain history which makes it itself).
What you're saying would imply the need not just for a self, but for said self to be independent of your history, like an external agent, and able to make decisions that are not depended on its past (and hence its presice state).
But (my argument is) the core and sole essense of one's self is it's past (as expressed in your state this very moment). That, and nothing else.
Note also that traditionally "God knowing everything" in advance didn't sound conflicting with free will. Free does't necessarily matter that the decision has to be taken on the spot -- just that it will reflect what you want it to be.
Put another way: you StavrosK has to take a decision now.
What would "free will" be in this case?
Some thinking thing (your soul?) standing above your brain and making decisions that might or might not fit with your past, brain wiring, memories etc?
Or you (your brain wiring etc) making a decision by drawing upon its very state, which in turn is affected by its past experiences and previous history, to the very detail, so that it can only make a single specific desicision (the one you end up taking)?
Where would any other decision besides the one you take come from? That would be like a third person being inside your head, given all the details and told to make a decision that might be whatever...
P.S. Not also that determinism != ability to predict in advance necessarily, even if you have perfect knowledge. For some systems (e.g. certain finite automata) you have to run them and you get the state piecemeal, by running them only.
There's no shortcut function that tells you the state at moment X(10000) without having to do through the previous 10000 steps (unlike say ballistics, where if you know the initial power, angle etc, you can calculate in O(1) the path at any later moment).
Of course you could always run the steps faster. But if the universe is deterministic, then you'd have to run the universe faster, which is not doable.
(This argument or similar is put forward by Wolfram IIRC).
We're getting deep into philosophy here, but I'm not sure that, if you froze the state of the universe right before someone made a decision and replayed it, they'd make the same decision every time. I guess that's the whole difference.
What would have changed in the case of the replay though?
For something to change it either needs randomness (which itself is not "free will") or an agent independent of his material status.
Not just independent from his body etc mind you: but also independent from his neurons, neural connections, memories stored in the brain's substrate etc.
Else, if all those are the same, shouldn't the decision be two?
I've heard two alternative solutions to this questions:
One from Penrose, who implies that quantum mechanic mechanisms in the brain (microtubules) bring randomness and casual independence into it (but it doesn't strike me as satisfactory, because randomness it not free will, and besides the theory has had some hard criticism).
The second is the classic idea of soul -- which is independent from the body and can make decisions outside of the constraints of its physical status (e.g. if it was "replayed" as you say, it could have made another decision).
This is not very satisfactory to me either, not because it assumes a metaphysical soul (I'm willing to accept that), but because it assumes one's self (his "soul") is independent from his past, and given the same exact past experiences it can come to two different conclusions (when "replayed" etc).
But if we aren't our past, and the way our memories and brain matter is wired, what are why? Who would that soul connect to my inner being, if it's independent of my past?
The same can be said for the specific arrangement of dust interstellar gas. Suggesting said gas has free will just means your definition of free will is basically matter with a past or even more abstractly just math.
The same can be said for the specific arrangement of dust interstellar gas. Suggesting said gas has free will just means your definition of free will is basically matter with a past or even more abstractly just math.
Yes, the same can be said for it. Though, obviously will from will can have quantitative differences.
One involves much more complex math.
What else did you expect? God and an immortal soul?
What else did you expect? God and an immortal soul?
No, but if your going to say rocks have free will your using the term to mean something well outside the generally accepted understanding. At which point you probably want a new word to avoid confusion.
What exactly is the middle ground between randomness and determinism?
Pre-determined, on the other hand, it's not incompatible with free will (precisely because free-will doesn't mean "randomness" -- it just means it's not imposed upon you by an external agent.
[...]
That is, you are your history (and JUST that), and the only decision your self could make is a decision based on its precise history, which is exactly what it makes every time.
To me this seems to just push the problem a bit around. How does your self evolve over time? How does it make decisions? Is it deterministic or random? Or again what could a middle ground be?
Comments
That's a simplistic dichotomy.
Random implies no agent (self) at all. It's just a roll of the dice.
Pre-determined, on the other hand, it's not incompatible with free will (precisely because free-will doesn't mean "randomness" -- it just means it's not imposed upon you by an external agent.
Let's imagine a totally deterministic universe. How could ever pre-determined play well with "not imposed upon you by an external agent"?
Because this pre-determined you is not an external agent imposing its will on a third subject, it's exactly who you are as a "self".
That is, you are your history (and JUST that), and the only decision your self could make is a decision based on its precise history, which is exactly what it makes every time.
Anything else wouldn't be YOU or YOUR free will, it will be arbitrary (random).
So, I think people just have this misconception that "free will" should have the emphasis on "free" -- to mean "whatever".
But the emphasis should be that it's a "will", i.e. the expression of the subject. And such an expression can only be understood in the sense of a subject that has history (you weren't just born this instant) and that makes decisions precisely drawing upon that history -- not just as a source of inspiration of his final decision, but as the total embodiment of his past (with all its aspects) in his decision.
In other words, free will is not you being free to will anything. It's just you being free to be you -- an entity of a concrete past.
I disagree with at least one of your premises. In a deterministic universe, one could (assuming perfect knowledge) predict this exact comment you would make now, thousands of years before you were even born. How is that free will?
I disagree that there can be free will when all your actions can be known to an omniscient party beforehand. Where's the freedom in that?
How is that not?
Your objection just restates "for me free will shouldn't be deterministic and its decisions shouldn't be known in advance".
Whereas the core of my argument was that it doesn't matter if it's deterministic and known in advance, because it's still the inevitable expression of one's self (which has a certain history which makes it itself).
What you're saying would imply the need not just for a self, but for said self to be independent of your history, like an external agent, and able to make decisions that are not depended on its past (and hence its presice state).
But (my argument is) the core and sole essense of one's self is it's past (as expressed in your state this very moment). That, and nothing else.
Note also that traditionally "God knowing everything" in advance didn't sound conflicting with free will. Free does't necessarily matter that the decision has to be taken on the spot -- just that it will reflect what you want it to be.
Put another way: you StavrosK has to take a decision now.
What would "free will" be in this case?
Some thinking thing (your soul?) standing above your brain and making decisions that might or might not fit with your past, brain wiring, memories etc?
Or you (your brain wiring etc) making a decision by drawing upon its very state, which in turn is affected by its past experiences and previous history, to the very detail, so that it can only make a single specific desicision (the one you end up taking)?
Where would any other decision besides the one you take come from? That would be like a third person being inside your head, given all the details and told to make a decision that might be whatever...
P.S. Not also that determinism != ability to predict in advance necessarily, even if you have perfect knowledge. For some systems (e.g. certain finite automata) you have to run them and you get the state piecemeal, by running them only.
There's no shortcut function that tells you the state at moment X(10000) without having to do through the previous 10000 steps (unlike say ballistics, where if you know the initial power, angle etc, you can calculate in O(1) the path at any later moment).
Of course you could always run the steps faster. But if the universe is deterministic, then you'd have to run the universe faster, which is not doable.
(This argument or similar is put forward by Wolfram IIRC).
We're getting deep into philosophy here, but I'm not sure that, if you froze the state of the universe right before someone made a decision and replayed it, they'd make the same decision every time. I guess that's the whole difference.
What would have changed in the case of the replay though?
For something to change it either needs randomness (which itself is not "free will") or an agent independent of his material status.
Not just independent from his body etc mind you: but also independent from his neurons, neural connections, memories stored in the brain's substrate etc.
Else, if all those are the same, shouldn't the decision be two?
I've heard two alternative solutions to this questions:
One from Penrose, who implies that quantum mechanic mechanisms in the brain (microtubules) bring randomness and casual independence into it (but it doesn't strike me as satisfactory, because randomness it not free will, and besides the theory has had some hard criticism).
The second is the classic idea of soul -- which is independent from the body and can make decisions outside of the constraints of its physical status (e.g. if it was "replayed" as you say, it could have made another decision).
This is not very satisfactory to me either, not because it assumes a metaphysical soul (I'm willing to accept that), but because it assumes one's self (his "soul") is independent from his past, and given the same exact past experiences it can come to two different conclusions (when "replayed" etc).
But if we aren't our past, and the way our memories and brain matter is wired, what are why? Who would that soul connect to my inner being, if it's independent of my past?
The same can be said for the specific arrangement of dust interstellar gas. Suggesting said gas has free will just means your definition of free will is basically matter with a past or even more abstractly just math.
All hail, F(x) = x + 1, it now get's to vote.
Yes, the same can be said for it. Though, obviously will from will can have quantitative differences.
One involves much more complex math.
What else did you expect? God and an immortal soul?
What else did you expect? God and an immortal soul?
No, but if your going to say rocks have free will your using the term to mean something well outside the generally accepted understanding. At which point you probably want a new word to avoid confusion.
That's a simplistic dichotomy.
What exactly is the middle ground between randomness and determinism?
Pre-determined, on the other hand, it's not incompatible with free will (precisely because free-will doesn't mean "randomness" -- it just means it's not imposed upon you by an external agent.
[...]
That is, you are your history (and JUST that), and the only decision your self could make is a decision based on its precise history, which is exactly what it makes every time.
To me this seems to just push the problem a bit around. How does your self evolve over time? How does it make decisions? Is it deterministic or random? Or again what could a middle ground be?