Actually, this is a problem that runs through all of academia, and is hardly confined to crypto. Program committee members (at least in computer science) seldom have the time to thoroughly review submissions, and computer science papers submitted elsewhere (say, PNAS or Science) are rarely given a thorough review by computer scientists.
As a particularly fun example, see this fun example of a computer vision paper that was published in Science in 2008, titled "100% Accuracy in Automatic Face Recognition", published by two psychologists:
That was a very patient and kindly-worded response. I'd think that a psychology background would teach exactly the wrong lessons about the use of statistics in hard technology problems. In psychology research, the function of statistics is to persuade other psychologists, and persuading other psychologists of the importance of your research is the sole measure of success or failure. They're not used to find flaws in one's own work.
As for poorly-reviewed papers, it must be embarrassing when they make headlines.
Cool stuff. I'm using entropy (Kolmogorov entropy) to do multiphase (oil and gas) flow pattern recognition, and transition detection from a flow pattern to another.
Yeah, when I originally read about this I thought more or less the same thing. A low amount of entropy is already assumed in various attacks (like dictionary attacks), or even just guessing based on your knowledge of the person who created the password, it's the same deal. I don't see how you can assume the same thing for RSA keypairs though...
Yeah, I meant that it's not exactly the same level. Certain implementations of RSA were using broken sources of entropy, but it's not the same as "Bob always uses his address as his password" which has no entropy.
OK, sure, but if you want something more to do with ciphertexts than with key generation, consider this: "textbook" RSA is not secure. The reason is that the "textbook" RSA algorithm is not randomized; that is also the reason why so much effort has gone into randomized padding schemes like this:
Comments
"My guess is that there wasn't enough crypto expertise on the program committee to reject the paper." Oh, snap!
Actually, this is a problem that runs through all of academia, and is hardly confined to crypto. Program committee members (at least in computer science) seldom have the time to thoroughly review submissions, and computer science papers submitted elsewhere (say, PNAS or Science) are rarely given a thorough review by computer scientists.
As a particularly fun example, see this fun example of a computer vision paper that was published in Science in 2008, titled "100% Accuracy in Automatic Face Recognition", published by two psychologists:
http://www.sciencemag.org/content/319/5862/435.abstract
The title should say enough to anyone who has the faintest idea about computer vision. Then read this very politely-worded response: http://www.sciencemag.org/content/321/5891/912.3.full
That was a very patient and kindly-worded response. I'd think that a psychology background would teach exactly the wrong lessons about the use of statistics in hard technology problems. In psychology research, the function of statistics is to persuade other psychologists, and persuading other psychologists of the importance of your research is the sole measure of success or failure. They're not used to find flaws in one's own work.
As for poorly-reviewed papers, it must be embarrassing when they make headlines.
Cool stuff. I'm using entropy (Kolmogorov entropy) to do multiphase (oil and gas) flow pattern recognition, and transition detection from a flow pattern to another.
What is minimum entropy referred to here? Is it -log(max(p))?
Yes. As opposed to Shannon entropy -sum(p log p).
Yeah, when I originally read about this I thought more or less the same thing. A low amount of entropy is already assumed in various attacks (like dictionary attacks), or even just guessing based on your knowledge of the person who created the password, it's the same deal. I don't see how you can assume the same thing for RSA keypairs though...
Slightly off topic, but low-entropy during RSA key generation is a serious problem:
https://factorable.net/weakkeys12.extended.pdf
Yeah, I meant that it's not exactly the same level. Certain implementations of RSA were using broken sources of entropy, but it's not the same as "Bob always uses his address as his password" which has no entropy.
OK, sure, but if you want something more to do with ciphertexts than with key generation, consider this: "textbook" RSA is not secure. The reason is that the "textbook" RSA algorithm is not randomized; that is also the reason why so much effort has gone into randomized padding schemes like this:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OAEP